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Brexit	will	affect,	but	not	determine,	the	EU’s	roles	in
a	changing	world	arena
What	effects	might	Brexit	have	on	the	EU’s	capacity	to	play	an	effective	role	in	the	world	arena?
Michael	Smith	writes	that	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	suggests	both	the	UK	and	EU	will	have	to
reassess	their	global	roles	and	their	discourses	of	globalism,	but	whereas	for	the	UK	this	is	an
existential	problem,	for	the	EU	it	is	part	of	a	continuing	evolution	–	and	one	which	is	likely	to	be
shaped	and	re-shaped	more	by	global	forces	than	by	the	changing	status	of	Britain.
Both	the	EU	and	the	UK	have	well-developed	discourses	of	globalism	and	their	places	within	a	global	system.	For
the	UK,	this	has	evolved	from	the	original	doctrine	of	the	‘three	circles’	inspired	by	Churchillian	rhetoric	after	World
War	II,	through	the	‘retreat	to	Europe’	in	the	1970s	and	into	the	current	image	of	a	‘buccaneering’	global	Britain
projected	by	many	Brexiteers,	including	the	Prime	Minister.	As	part	of	this	evolution,	for	at	least	some	Eurosceptic
Britons,	membership	of	the	European	Community	and	then	the	EU	was	defined	as	part	of	a	defeat	and	a	retreat
from	global	power,	and	this	conception	has	played	its	part	in	recent	Brexiteer	rhetoric.	For	the	EU	and	the	Brussels
institutions,	the	discourse	of	globalism	has	been	more	about	how	the	Union	might	realise	a	global	role,	initially	as	a
‘civilian’	or	‘normative’	power	and	more	recently	as	a	power	of	a	conventional	type.	The	EU’s	Global
Strategy	published	in	2016	expressed	this	view	of	a	‘strategically	autonomous’	Union,	wielding	at	least	some	of	the
attributes	of	a	‘normal’	power	to	pursue	a	harder-edged	role	in	the	world	arena.
A	study	of	discourse	and	rhetoric,	however,	tells	us	little	about	how	things	might	actually	develop.	As	argued	by	my
article	in	a	recent	special	issue	on	post-Brexit	EU	policies,	one	way	of	exploring	how	discourses	are	converted	into
policy	and	action	is	to	assess	the	roles	conceived	and	played	by	the	UK	and	the	EU.	In	this	way,	it	is	possible	to
see	the	focus	on	‘global	Britain’	as	a	way	of	conceiving	a	new	and	more	expansive	global	role,	and	to	see	the	EU’s
Global	Strategy	as	expressing	the	aim	of	playing	a	new	and	more	hard-edged	role	in	the	world.	But	the	key	is	to
look	at	the	ways	these	roles	might	develop	in	specific	areas	of	policy,	and	to	see	how	they	might	interact	in	the
future.	The	picture	is	necessarily	a	mixed	one,	but	it	points	towards	more	fundamental	problems	for	the	UK	than	for
the	EU	as	a	consequence	of	Brexit.	The	real	problems	for	the	EU	come	from	elsewhere,	as	a	look	at	several	policy
areas	indicates.
Central	to	the	future	relationship	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	is	the	focus	on	 trade	and	development.	Much	of	the
attention	of	negotiators	and	the	public	for	the	next	year	is	likely	to	be	on	this	area	and	particularly	on	trade.	Both	the
EU	and	post-Brexit	UK	are	‘trading	states’,	highly	dependent	on	international	conditions	to	achieve	prosperity	and
domestic	stability.	But	for	the	UK,	the	question	of	trade	in	a	post-Brexit	world	will	be	conditioned	by	the	continuing
vulnerability,	shaping	its	capacity	to	negotiate	favourable	agreements	not	only	with	the	EU	but	also	with	a	large
group	of	powerful	potential	partners.	For	the	EU,	the	challenge	will	not	be	as	sharp	–	the	loss	of	the	UK	is
significant	but	not	fundamental	–	but	there	are	other	challenges	in	an	increasingly	polarised	global	political
economy,	from	the	US,	China	and	beyond.	The	linked	question	of	development	is	arguably	less	challenging	since
there	are	already	mechanisms	aimed	at	coordinating	development	assistance	activities	among	a	mixed
constellation	of	governmental	and	non-governmental	organisations	in	specific	regions;	so	the	post-Brexit
relationship	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	is	in	principle	capable	of	being	managed,	assuming	that	basic	changes	in
UK	and	EU	policies	are	avoided.
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A	second	key	area	of	interaction	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	in	a	post-Brexit	world	is	that	of	security	and	defence.
For	the	British,	separation	from	the	infrastructure	of	EU	security	cooperation	(both	military	and	non-military)	would
constitute	a	major	challenge	to	practices	and	processes	built	up	for	decades	–	practices	and	processes	to	which	the
UK	has	made	a	central	contribution,	despite	their	awkwardness	in	specific	cases.	This	is	particularly	true	of	non-
military	cooperation	in	areas	such	as	the	fight	against	terrorism	and	the	security	aspects	of	migration.
Whilst	NATO	might	be	seen	as	a	substitute	in	some	respects,	the	depth	and	extent	of	cooperation	in	the	EU	context
has	been	both	distinctive	and	cumulative.	For	the	EU,	the	loss	of	the	UK’s	links	to	intelligence	networks	–	for
example,	the	‘five	eyes’	grouping	–	and	of	the	more	general	British	capacity	to	deal	effectively	with	global	security
problems,	is	a	genuine	loss,	and	one	that	constitutes	an	incentive	to	the	negotiation	of	post-Brexit	arrangements;
but	not	all	EU	member	states	are	convinced	of	the	benefits	of	a	close	security	relationship	(beyond	NATO)	with	the
British,	partly	because	of	the	UK’s	close	links	with	the	US	and	partly	because	of	recent	scandals	relating	to	the	UK’s
failures	in	police	and	judicial	cooperation.
This	uncertainty	in	security	and	defence	links	closely	with	the	third	area	of	post-Brexit	uncertainty:	transatlantic
relations.	The	challenge	of	the	Trump	administration	is	in	many	ways	a	crystallisation	of	trends	that	have	been
noticeable	for	a	while:	a	US	focus	on	hard	power	and	military	methods	as	opposed	to	soft	power	and	negotiation,
the	globalism	of	US	policies	and	the	shift	of	US	attention	to	the	Indo-Pacific	and	the	Asia-Pacific	regions,	the
increasing	weaponisation	of	trade	and	economic	policies	in	US	foreign	policy.	For	the	British,	this	is	the	sharpest	of
dilemmas:	their	security	and	economic	interests	dictate	a	complex	and	sensitive	balance	between	apparently
irreconcilable	forces	in	the	US	and	the	EU,	a	balance	thrown	into	strong	relief	by	recent	disputes	over	the	role
of	Huawei	in	5G	telecommunications,	over	policy	towards	Iran,	and	over	a	range	of	trade	issues.	This	potent	mix
will	only	become	more	disabling	in	post-Brexit	framing	of	the	‘global	Britain’	discourse,	again	pointing	to	the
exposed	and	vulnerable	position	of	the	UK.	For	the	EU,	as	noted	above,	the	close	links	between	the	UK	and	the	US
are	challenging	as	they	look	to	negotiate	the	future	relationship	with	London,	and	the	EU	has	itself	proved
vulnerable	to	the	Trump	challenge;	but	the	political	economies	of	scale	offered	by	EU	collective	action	can
potentially	prove	an	important	insulating	factor.
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Both	London	and	Brussels	will	find	it	difficult	to	translate	role	conceptions	into	role	design	and	institutionalisation,
and	both	will	experience	problems	of	role	performance	in	the	post-Brexit	world.	For	the	UK,	however,	characterised
by	exposure	and	vulnerability	in	many	areas,	the	challenge	is	more	fundamental	than	for	the	EU;	after	all,	the
debate	about	the	EU’s	proper	role	in	the	global	arena	has	been	going	on	for	fifty	years,	and	there	is	an
accumulation	of	habits	of	collective	action	(and	inaction)	that	can	be	drawn	upon.	The	defection	of	the	UK	is	thus	in
principle	a	manageable	challenge;	less	easily	managed	are	the	large	changes	in	the	global	arena	that	threaten	to
marginalise	the	EU	in	a	more	polarised	and	geopolitics-centred	world.	Whilst	this	is	evidently	recognised	in	the	new
EU	leadership,	and	the	discourse	of	geopolitics	has	strengthened	in	recent	months,	there	is	no	evidence	yet	that
this	challenge	can	easily	be	overcome.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	first	appeared	on	our	sister	site,	LSE	Brexit.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of
EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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